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THEATRE LOGISTIC PLANNING 
A lecture delivered by 
Capt. Henry E. Eccles, USN 
at the Naval War College 
March 28, 1950 
I-INTRODUCTION
RESTRICTED 
An understanding of theater logistic planning is bas�d on 
the understanding of: 
The nature and structure of Logistics ; the art of command; 
and the nature of war. 
These subjects are all so intertwined that there is no ad­
vantage in trying to decide which comes first, the hen or the egg. 
Furthermore, we are not so· much concerned with the mani­
fold details of planning and planning forms as we are with the 
major elements, problems and relationships that confront the 
theater commander in planning his logistics. So I shall disriiiss: d¢­
tails and forms with the statement that planning forms are in a 
process of development in all our major military colleges and many 
important details of theater logistics are ably discussed in Chapter 
VII of "Joint Overseas Operations". Rather than go into detail in 
these matters let me take my cue from the 3rd Chapter of the 
Second Epistle to the Corinthians where St. Paul says-"Not of the 
letter but of the spirit. For the letter killeth but the spirit -giveth 
life." Let us therefore try to develop the basic spirit· or philosophy 
of theater logistics: 
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II-DEFINITIONS.
First, a definition of Logistics : 
"Strategy and Tactics provide the scheme for the 
conduct of military operations. Logistics pro­
vide the means therefor." 
This broad and simple definition has the great advantage of 
expressing a relationship between the three major elements of war. 
Every problem in war contains these three elements in varying 
degrees. Perhaps it will help us to consider them as three inter-
secting rings. (Illustration No. 1). 
Logistics itself can be said to have three basic elements: 
The Determination of Requirements; Procurement and 
Distribution, and the aspects of Organization, Planning, Execution 
and Supervision. These elements and aspects all enter into every 
problem in logistics and they blend and overlap in manner and de­
gree which varies greatly according to circumstances. 
In general, logistic problems fall into the six broad categories 
of Personnel, Supply, Maintenance, Medical, Transportation and 
Base Development, or simplifying it greatly, Men, Material and 
Services. 
III-THE UNIFIED COMMAND
Theater Logistic Planning derives directly from the concepts
of Unified Command as established by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
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"In the future, theaters of war will be organized as 
Unified Commands. In so far as practicable each service 
will handle its own logistics under broad coordinating 
policies established by the Unified Commander. But when 
the Unified Commander sees the need for the consolida­
tion of logistic activity he will tell us and we will order 
it. Furthermore, the Unified Commander by reason of his 
authority of review of requirements and recommendations 
of priorities and programs, has the power to exercise direct 
logistical control almost as he sees fit just so long as he 
keeps out of operating detail.." 
If we examine the proposed draft of "Joint Action Armed 
Forces," Chapter III Section VII "Logistics (Wartime) ," we see 
that the conferees who may have been at odds in many other in­
stances, agree on the nature and degree of control the theater com­
mander may exercise in war. Theater Commanders will have the au­
thority to exercise a very high degree of control in that they are 
specifically responsible for policy and coordination in distribution, 
supply build-up, maintenance, salvage, base development, trans­
portation, port operation, medical and dental service and military 
government. Thus we have real unification in the theater of war. 
IV-THE NATURE OF WAR
A few words on the nature of war as it affects theater
logistic planning. It is a truism to say that the only constant in 
war is variation. War is the constant interplay of variables. In 
general it is fought in accordance with campaign plans designed to 
accomplish specific objectives, the selection of which is the task of 
strategy. The campaign plan for the Central Pacific was originally 
drafted in late 1943 and given the code name Granite. In its or-
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iginal form it contemplated five separate major amphibious opera­
tions-Gilberts, Marshalls, Eniwetok, Truk and the Marianas. This 
was amended in June 1944 to abandon Truk, and extend the offen-
sive through Palaus, Mindinau, Luzon, and Formosa and Amoy on 
the China Coast. While this campaign plan was not- followed pre­
cisely, it nevertheless provided the foundation for the logistic sup­
port of the actual operations we did undertake. 
Campaigns are usually made up of a series of operations 
which themselves may be either simple or complex, brief or pro­
tracted, depending on the characteristics of the theater of war, the 
capabilities of the opposing forces and other variables. All wars 
. seem to have one common characteristic, i. e., they consist of long 
periods of comparative inactivity interspered with short periods 
of violent conflict. However, this period of comparative quiet is 
actually the period of logistic build-up. The process may be likened 
to the charging and discharge of an electrical condenser. 
This is very well illustrated by a graph of cargo and person­
nel shipped by the Army to overseas Atlantic areas in the last war. 
(Illustration No. 2) Note particularly the expanding scale of activity 
and the build-up before each operation. 
Looking at this from a purely theoretical point of view we 
may analyze the chart somewhat as follows: (Illustration No. 3) 
A steady expansion of theater forces engaged in routine operations 
such as patrols, reconnaissance and defensive actions, a progressive 
build-up of supplies and equipment for a campaign, and special 
build-up and measures for specific operations. 
Actually, the build-up prior to each operation only partially 
supported the operation it was intended for. In the Pacific we 
found often that we were financing one operation with the ma­
terial and men originally assembled for the previous one, but which 
RESTRICTED 5 
5
Eccles: Theatre Logistic Planning
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
a,
 

















































































































































































































































































� .... � � CD iii Ill 
I ,, ,, , , I 
I I I I I I




































 \ I I I
 I I I I I
 I I I I
 I I I I
 I I I I I



















































































































� � a �
6







SCHEMATIC DIAGRAM OF 
AMOUNT OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT 
IN A 
THEATER OF WAR, 
BUILDUP FOR SPECIFIC OPERATIO NS 
JULY JAN JULY 
RESTRICTED 
JAN 
'-------- ··- ---------L------ · - ------...J
ILLUSTRATION NO. 3 
RESTRICTED 7 
7
Eccles: Theatre Logistic Planning
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
-arrived opportunely enough to be of use in the base development of
the island just captured.
V-THE BASIC THEATER LOGISTIC PLAN
The charts have shown a: steadily expanding logistic effort. 
How do we coordinate this expansion and at the same time pro­
vide for the efficient support of our day-to-day operations? Here we 
come to the philosophic basis of theater logistic planning and again 
I present a purely theoretical concept: A Basic Theater Logistic 
Plan-a plan which in actual practice may very well be Paragraph 
4 or the Logistic Annex of a conventional campaign plan. This 
basic plan is the heart and soul of the day-to-day operations in a 
theater of war and it provides the material build-up for the initia­
tion of offensive operations. 
Let us start in the center of the chart (Illustration No. 4) 
and work out. Every basic theater logistic plan is built .on four 
fundamental considerations. First, . the characteristics of the 
theater, its geography, topography and hydrography, its relative 
distances and its distance from the continental U. S. Next we 
have the - forces involved, then the nature of the operations con­
templated and finally, the requirements for mutual or inter­
theater support. 
In the second circle we have six functional elements; Supply, 
Maintenance, Medical, Personnel, Transportation and Base Devel� 
opment. You may choose any functional elements you wish-those 
shown here are merely representative groupings of the major ele­
ments which seem to be common to all theatres. 
The theatre commander examines each functional element in 
the light of the inter-play of variables in the four fundamental con­
siderations and reaches certain types of decisions, which are indi-
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cated in the outer ring. The theater commander will decide to ex­
ercise direct control of certain' elements. In other cases he will 
delegate control to component commanders. In some instances he 
will consolidate all of certain activities, in other cases he will merely 
outline general policies. A:nd finally in my opinion he wm · be wise 
to ignore certain matters, particularly problems which may work 
themselyes out if left alone. 
The summation of these decisions becomes the basic theater 
logistic plan. If wisely developed this not only establishes the pro­
cedures and policies governing the normal logistics of the theater 
but it becomes sound standing operating procedure for the develop­
ment of the logistics of specific operations. 
On 31 October 1945 CINCPOA'S standing operating pro­
cedures governing logistic support of theater forces filled 98 pages. 
These were condensations and revisions of many times that volume 
of directives which were in effect on V-J Day. By proper planning I 
think they could have been boiled down to 20 to 30 pages. 
VI-DETAILS OF THE BASIC PLAN
With this general background let us discuss some of the as­
pects of this plan. First, consider the relation between supply and 
transportation. In any war of the future, -American forces must 
combine great firepower with great mobility. It may well be that 
an increase . in the efficiency and reliability of our transportation 
and distribution system will permit us to lower our usual levels of 
supply without danger to our combat forces. This would, of course, 
increase mobility. In any event we must realize that any unnec­
essarily high level of supply reduces mobility. 
It is very probable that the theater commander will keep a 
very close watch on his supplies of ammunition. This is a very 
10 RESTRICTED 
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specialized field and with the increasing use of new types of guided
missiles and rockets, new problems in storage_ and distribution will 
undoubtedly arise. 
The very fact that an area petroleum officer is a member of 
every theater commander's staff indicates that the theater com­
mander actually controls the distribution of petroleum throughout 
his command. In this connection it is well to remember that when 
we operate major Naval task forces overseas, the oil requirements 
are so great that any advanced base storage we can build ashore 
is merely a. surge tank in the supply pipeline of fast tankers. 
When we remember that one B-36 bombardment group will 
burn up a million gallons of aviation gasoline on a single mission, 
and that our fleet in its operations at Okinawa used twelve million 
barrels of oil, the importance of close control of petroleum products 
at the theater level should become very clear. This is especially so 
since this tremendous bulk must be kept in motion ; it may be 
slowed, or speeded up, but there is no way that any considerable part 
may be set down to await prospective use. There just never is that 
much storage capacity. Furthermore any undue retention of fast 
tankers to build up ready supplies will result in shortages months 
later. 
VII----TRANSPORTATION 
In addition to its effect on levels of supply, the subject of 
transportation raises some very interesting points. From·time to 
time the suggestion is made that ocean transportation will be con­
trolled wholly from Washington. While undoubtedly Washington. 
must of necessity exercise a very important degree of control in 
world shipping, still we must remember that the theater command­
ers have the major combat operational responsibility and therefore 
RESTRICTED 11 
11
Eccles: Theatre Logistic Planning
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 1950
RESTRICTED 
must have commensurate logistical operational authority. Actually 
a compromise will probably be made but it should be based on recog­
nition of many considerations. 
The subject of transportation falls into two main categories; 
operation and traffic management, and an understanding of the na­
ture of these is important to all who deal with logistics. Operation 
•concerns itself primarily with the most efficient management of the
carrier, be it ail airplane, a truck or a ship. Traffic management is 
concerned with the most efficient distribution of the material which
is being transported.
It is very important that these two aspects of transporta­
tion be considered as separate and that their relative importance be 
clearly understood. The proper goal of carrier operation is to serve 
. the demands of traffic management.· 
In considering operation we must bear in mind that oceanic 
shipping is world-wide and so cuts across all theaters of war and 
that in wartime it involves commercially-manned as well as Navy­
manned ships, that it is internationally owned and operated and 
.. that it involves so-called strategic shipping and cargoes for the sup­
port of allies and neutrals as well as the strictly military or op­
. erational cargoes. However, a theater combat commander views his 
transportation problem as a whole whereas the transportation op­
eration agencies may tend to view their problems from the some­
what narrower aspect of a shipping company, an airline or a truck­
ing company or railroad. 
When a theatre commander has this broad point of view he 
may change th� emphasis of his concern from one means of trans­
portation to another as varying needs of the combat situation de­
mand, and make the necessary adjustments .. 
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If all transportation were to be controlled from Washington, 
that responsiveness to immediate or vital local needs would tend to 
become sluggish. On the other hand the theater commander must un­
derstand the far-reaching effects of "retentions" on the whole ship­
ping picture. 
We may conclude therefore that the theater commander 
must exercise a high degree of control of all transportation, that 
the actual carrier operation be delegated, and that the theater com­
mander reserve to hims�lf movement control and traffic manage­
ment. The control of material flow is. best exercised by allocations 
of cargo space to component commanders. It goes �ithout saying 
that the commander himself must understand the nature of the 
problem. In addition he requires the staff assistance of experts in 
this important and highly specialized field. 
In a very real sense we may think of transportation as the 
mortar, or bond, that ties all parts of the theater logistic system 
together. All over the theater, men and material are constantly 
in motion. A bottleneck anywhere inevitably slows down traffic 
all along the line, and a sudden closing of any valve may well rup­
ture the pipeline. An enormous amount of energy is lost in the 
inertia of starting and stopping the flow, and it should be the 
theater commander's objective to keep the flow of traffic as smooth 
and continuous as his military operations will permit. 
The general term maintenance covers a multitude of prob­
lems. In a theater in .which major naval forces are operating, it 
includes ship maintenance, repair and salvage. Normally of course 
such matters are of primary concern to the Navy Component 
Commander (Fleet Commander) who handles them through the 
type and task force commanders. However, in such cases we fre­
quently find that the theater commander is a Naval officer and in 
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that case, so far, he has always worn two hats, theater and fleet, in 
which case the theater commander is very much concerned with 
such problems and his plans so indicate. 
VIII-PLANNING FOR A SPECIFIC OPERATION
Rather than dwell too long on the basic theater logistic 
plan, let us pass to logistic planning for a specific operation. It is in 
connection with these specific operations that we encounter two 
terms that are frequently misused: "feasibility" and "calculated 
risk". In some instal!ces it is considered that the logistics section 
of a staff decides the logistic feasibility of a contemplated course 
of action. This, of course, is not the case. The logistics section 
assists the commander in determining feasibility by making a 
logistic estimate or staff study. This estimate is a calculation of 
the logistic requirements necessary to support the operation, and 
a study of how logistic resources may best be employed to fulfill 
these requirements. The summary includes statements of pros­
pective deficiencies, with estimates as to how these deficiencies may 
limit the freedom of action of the commander and recommendations 
as to what can or should be done to overcome or compensate for 
the prospective deficiencies. The commander then decides the logistic 
feasibility of his course of action and he decides the risk involved, 
balancing this calculated risk against the gains to be achieved. · I 
know of no finer discussion of the calculated risk than that con­
tained on page 34 of Fleet Admiral King's, "US Navy �t War 
1941-1945.". Calculating risk is an exacting exercise of profess­
ional judgment and the term should not be used loosely as a 
blanket to cover the corpse of sloppy thinking. 
Planning for an operation has the same general character­
istics as basic planning in that it derives from, and must be cons. 
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current with, strategic planning, and it is governed by the same 
basic considerations, and results in similar types of decisions. · But 
in ope;ational planning, most logistic tasks are delegated to task
force commanders with the component and type commanders acting 
in support. However, the need for keeping the enemy off balance 
requires that offensive operations be launched as rapidly as logistic 
considerations permit. Since task force planning staffs cannot be 
rapidly asssembled and then quickly start to plan effectively, it 
is necessary. for th� theater commander to prepare many of the 
plans that in theory .should be made by the task force commander. 
There simply is no other staff which can do this work in time to 
meet target dates. 
The most practicable means of "beating" the vital factor of 
lead time is by submitting long range forecasts. In World War II 
CINCPOA issued staff studies and general planning directives 
months in advance of his operational directives and this enabled -his 
component and type commanders to calculate and submit material . 
and personnel forecasts. This combination of staff study and pla�­
ning directive also permitted concurrent strategic and logistic plan­
ning at the operational level. Furthermore, even if the targets aiid 
dates were shifted, the logistic support built up by the forecasts 
usually fitted the new operation very well; 
We should never forget the fact that operational logistics 
actually acquire great and real physical momentum. Thousands 
of tons of solid material are actually moving. While tinder favorable 
conditions we can change the direction of the mass or somewhat 
modify its composition, there are other conditions where all the 
orders in the world have no effect. Recognition of lead time, fore­
casting, decentralization of execution, etc., all contribute to the 
flexibility we desire. Nevertheless we must understand that a 
reasonably good plan that is understood and is feasible of accom-
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plishment is far superior to the "perfect plan" which is difficult to 
understand and issued too late. So there always comes a time when 
we must· say "This is it-Let well· enough alone-No more 
changes!" 
I recommend to all of you the study of the plans for the 
' 
' 
· Olympic Operation, the invasion of Kyushu. For while there was in
that operation a dangerous lack of clarity in command relations,
the plans reflected very valuable experience in logistic planning.
IX-GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Let me off er some thoughts as to certain principles which ap­
ply to logistic planning at theater level. But first a word of caution 
as to the use of the word "principles". Since we are only just be­
ginning to develop logistic theory and principle we should not use 
the word in its strictest sense but rather in a very broad sense as a 
statement of something that we believe to be generally true. 
First: The combat commander must have control of his own 
logistic support. 
The corollary to this is that he must be competent to and 
prepared to exercise this control in harmony with the overall war 
effort-that is to say, in accordance with the principles of mutual 
support and unity of effort. A further corollary is that he must 
have a staff which is educated and organized to assist him to ex­
ercise this authority. To illustrate the growth of such a staff let us 
note the growth of the logistic section of Cincpoa's staff from Sep­
tember 1943 to July 1945: (Illustration No. 5) 
Second: As long as the supply of an itein or a "service" ex­
ceeds the requirement for that item or servi�e, strict control is not 
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necessary. When, however, a shortage exists, then theater control 
is called for. 
I suggest three corollaries to this : 
(a) The fewer the matters in which the theater com­
mander finds it necessary to exercise his power of con­
trol the better the logistic system and situation in: that 
theater. 
(b) A major task of the theatre logistics officer is to
look· ahead and anticipate shortages and the consequent 
need for controls, before they occur. 
(c) Any system of control of short items must be based
on allocations in order to be effective. Priorities, except as 
part of allocations, are ineffective and self-defeating. 
Third: The more detail that is put into any plan or order, 
the shorter the period of time during which that plan can usefully 
serve and the fewer the number of organizations that can be ef­
fectively controlled. 
Fourth: The higher the authority promulgating on order, 
the greater the time and effort required to milke a necessary change, 
and the more serious the consequences of a mistake or error in 
judgment. 
Fifth: Power and authority attract power and authority ·· 
.-They are magnetic. 
When the Unification Act of 1947 was first framed this 
tendency was clearly recognized. The Staff of the Joint Chiefs 
was limited to one hundred and the Secretary of Defense was pro­
hibited from having a military staff. The Joint Chiefs are now 
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permitted a staff of two hundred and ten and the civilian employees 
of the Secretary of Defense have increased greatly. Furthermore, 
it would appear that many officers who are carried on the personnel 
allowance lists of the military departments are actually spending 
much of their time performing duty with other offices within the 
Department of Defense. 
I mention these matters 1 because I fear the magnetic effect 
of power in that it will create a tendency in the Department of De­
fense to encroach upon the prerogatives and functions of theater 
commanders, and create principalities within the kingdom of the 
commander. 
X-EVALUATION OF LOGISTIC PLANS 
Many of you will leave here to. assume major planning res­
ponsibilities. I, therefore, suggest certain criteria which may be 
useful in evaluating the logistic plans you may encounter. 
But first a caution: We should always remember that any 
particular logistic plan can be analyzed only on the basis of a full 
knowledge of the strategic concepts and plans it is designed to sup­
port and · of the background of the command organization in the 
command itself. It is vital that all strategic and logistic planning 
be in fact concurrent, and all strategic plans be kept within the. 
limitations of our logistic capabilities. 
When you are sure of these fundamentals you may then ask: 
Are the theater command and the theater staff 
structures both designed for war? 
Is the theater Jtaff truly a joint staff? 
Are the plans up to date? 
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Do the plans provide for the · expansion and provision of 
logistic resources and services prior to the expansion of 
combat elements? 
Are the plans within the limitations of our mobilization 
capabilities? 
Do the plans provide a maximum degree of central policy 
control with decentralized execution and operation? 
Are the responsibilities of the component and type com­
manders clearly defined? 
Do the plans place reliance on standing operating pro­
cedures? 
Are there . provisions for reporting and redistributing 
excess stocks ? 
Do they provide for ready cross-servicing and use-of com­
mon facilities? 
Are there provisions for inter-theater mutual support? 
If these questions can be answered yes, the chances are 
that the plans and organizations will function well in war. In all 
cases, however, beware of a superficial analysis. 
XI-CONCLUSION
In conclusion, let me leave you with these thoughts; Theater
strategic and logistic planning are inseparable. In addition to 
growing concurrently with the strategic plans, the logistic plans " 
are intimately related to the command organization. A sound 
theater staff organization is essential to the formulation of good 
logistic plans and to their smooth execution. 
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Theater logistic planning consists of two main parts: First, 
the Basic Theater Logjstic Plan (Paragraph 4 or the logistic an­
nex of a conventional Campaign Plan), and second, developing from 
this, the Logistic Plan for a Specific Operation (Para 4 or the 
Logistics Annex of the Operation Plan). 
While good planning forms, factors and usage data are es­
sential tools, they themselves do not constitute nor produce good 
plans. Good plans are the product of the skilled professional 
judgment of the planner. 
And finally-Don't expect the plan you draw up in peace­
time to be the plan you necessarily use in war. Any peacetime 
plan, when you do not have or exercise the initiative, is merely 
the foundation and mental preparation for what you must do in 
war. And that mental preparation is more important than the 
plan itself. For only when the planning process, its major con­
siderations, and the various relations of cause and effect are clear­
ly understood, can our commanders make the rapid readjustments 
that are required when the early course of the war follows the 
enemy's plan rather than our plan. 
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